Case information

None.

Case summaries are prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). Please note that summaries are not provided to the Judges of the Court. They are placed on the Court file and website for information purposes only.

Criminal law - Search and seizure - Evidence - Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking - At what point does serious police misconduct, which led to the discovery and seizure of real evidence of a substantial quantity of drugs so taint the administration of justice as to require the exclusion of the evidence? - Whether the balancing exercise required at the final stage of the s. 24(2) Charter analysis requires a consideration of the fact that by admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Charter, the Court condones constitutional misconduct by police authorities - Whether the seriousness of the offence is the overriding consideration in assessing the third branch of the Collins test.

The Appellant, Bradley Harrison, was tried before Justice Karam in the Superior Court of Justice on a charge of trafficking in cocaine. The cocaine was found in the rear area of a rental vehicle which the Appellant was driving even though his driver’s licence was suspended. The seized cocaine weighed 35 kilograms (77 lbs.) and had a street value of between $2,463,000 and $4,575,000.

At the commencement of the six-day trial, the Appellant and his co-accused, Sean Friesen, brought an application to exclude the evidence relating to the seizure of the cocaine. Following a voir dire, the trial judge held that the police had violated the Appellant’s (and Mr. Friesen’s) rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter. However, the trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial continued. Mr. Friesen was acquitted in mid-trial, following a successful motion for a directed verdict on the basis that the vehicle rental agreement in his name was hearsay and, accordingly, the Crown could not prove possession. The Appellant called a defence and testified.
The trial judge convicted the Appellant and sentenced him to five years of imprisonment. On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Cronk J.A. dissenting would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal on the basis that the intentional police misconduct and violations of the Appellant’s constitutional rights undermine the integrity of the administration of justice and the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than its exclusion.