

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA**  
(ON APPEAL FROM THE ALBERTA COURT OF APPEAL)

IN THE MATTER of An Act to enact the *Impact Assessment Act* and the *Canadian Energy Regulator Act*, to amend the *Navigation Protection Act* and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 28 and the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019-285

AND IN THE MATTER of a Reference by the Lieutenant Governor in Council to the Court of Appeal of Alberta under the *Judicature Act*, RSA 2000, c J-2, s 26

BETWEEN:

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA**

Appellant

- and -

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA**

Respondent

- and -

*(Title of proceedings continued on next page)*

---

**FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER,**  
**ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN**  
(Pursuant to Rule 42 of the *Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada*, SOR/2002-156)

---

**ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR  
SASKATCHEWAN**

Constitutional Law  
820 – 1874 Scarth Street  
Regina, SK S4P 4B3

**Thomson Irvine, K.C.**  
**Noah Wernikowski**  
Telephone: (306) 787-6307  
Email: [tom.irvine@gov.sk.ca](mailto:tom.irvine@gov.sk.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney  
General of Saskatchewan

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**  
Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**D. Lynne Watt**  
Telephone: (613) 786-8695  
Fax: (613) 788-3509  
Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,  
Attorney General of Saskatchewan

*(style of cause continued)*

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NOVA SCOTIA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MANITOBA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SASKATCHEWAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, INDIAN RESOURCE COUNCIL, FILE HILLS QU'APPELLE TRIBAL COUNCIL AND PASQUA FIRST NATION, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND CANADA, NATURE CANADA AND WEST COAST ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, CANADIAN TAXPAYERS FEDERATION, ATHABASCA CHIPEWYAN FIRST NATION, BUSINESS COUNCIL OF ALBERTA, ECOJUSTICE CANADA SOCIETY, WOODLAND CREE FIRST NATION, MIKISEW CREE FIRST NATION, HYDRO-QUÉBEC, CANADIAN CONSTITUTION FOUNDATION, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AND BUSINESSES ASSOCIATION, AND ALBERTA ENTERPRISE GROUP, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF PHYSICIANS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, ADVOCATES FOR THE RULE OF LAW, OCEANS NORTH CONSERVATION SOCIETY, CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASSOCIATION, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENCE CANADA INC., AND MININGWATCH CANADA INC., EXPLORERS AND PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION OF CANADA, FIRST NATIONS MAJOR PROJECTS COALITION, CENTRE QUÉBÉCOIS DU DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, LUMMI NATION**

Intervenors

**ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR**

**COPIES TO:**

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
CANADA**

Department of Justice Canada  
Civil Litigation Sector  
50 O'Connor Street, Suite 500  
Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8

**Christopher Rupar**

**Dayna Anderson**

**Bruce Hughson**

**Kerry Boyd**

**James Elford**

Telephone: (613) 670-6290

Fax: (613) 954-1920

E-mail: [christopher.rupar@justice.gc.ca](mailto:christopher.rupar@justice.gc.ca)

Counsel for the Attorney General of  
Canada

**BENNETT JONES LLP**  
4500, 855 – 2<sup>nd</sup> Street SW  
Calgary AB T2P 4K7

**E. Bruce Mellett**  
**Bradley S. Gilmour**  
**Sean R. Assie**  
**Adam J. Williams**  
Telephone: (403) 298-3319 / 3382 /  
3362 / 3307  
Fax: (403) 265-7219  
Email: [mellettb@bennettjones.com](mailto:mellettb@bennettjones.com) /  
[gilmourb@bennettjones.com](mailto:gilmourb@bennettjones.com) /  
[assies@bennettjones.com](mailto:assies@bennettjones.com)  
[williamsa@bennettjones.com](mailto:williamsa@bennettjones.com)

**-and-**

**JUSTICE AND SOLICITOR  
GENERAL**  
11th Floor Oxford Tower, 10025 –  
102A Avenue  
Edmonton, AB T5J 2Z2

**Christine Enns, K.C.**  
**Randy Steele**  
Telephone: (780) 422-9703  
Fax: (780) 643-0852  
Email: [christine.enns@gov.ab.ca](mailto:christine.enns@gov.ab.ca)

**Counsel for the Respondent,  
Attorney General of Alberta**

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
ONTARIO**  
4th Floor, McMurty-Scott Building  
720 Bay Street  
Toronto, ON M7A 2S9

**Joshua Hunter**  
**Yashoda Ranganathan**  
Telephone: (647) 637-0883  
Fax: (416) 326-4015  
Email: [yashoda.ranganathan@ontario.ca](mailto:yashoda.ranganathan@ontario.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney  
General of Ontario

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**  
2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**D. Lynne Watt**  
Telephone: (613) 786-8695  
Fax: (613) 788-3509  
Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Respondent, Attorney General of Alberta

**MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE DU QUÉBEC**, Direction du droit constitutionnel et autochtone  
1200, route de l'Église,  
4e étage Québec, QC G1V 4M1

**Frédéric Perreault**

Telephone: (418) 643-1477 Ext: 20785  
Fax: (418) 633-7030  
Email: [frederic.perreault@justice.gouv.qc.ca](mailto:frederic.perreault@justice.gouv.qc.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of Québec

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NOVA SCOTIA**

Department of Justice (NS)  
1690 Hollis Street, 8th Floor  
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 2L6

**Edward A. Gores, K.C.**

Telephone: (902) 424-4024  
Fax: (902) 424-1730  
Email: [Edward.gores@novascotia.ca](mailto:Edward.gores@novascotia.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General Nova Scotia

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK**

Constitutional Unit, Legal Services Branch  
P.O. Box 6000, Stn. A  
Fredericton, NB E3B 5H1

**Isabel Lavoie-Daigle**

Telephone: (506) 453-2222  
Fax: (506) 453-3275  
Email: [isabell.lavoiedaigle@gnb.ca](mailto:isabell.lavoiedaigle@gnb.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of New Brunswick

**NOËL ET ASSOCIÉS, s.e.n.c.r.l.**  
225, montée Paiement, 2e étage  
Gatineau, QC J8P 6M7

**Pierre Landry**

Telephone: (819) 503-2178  
Fax: (819) 771-5397  
Email: [p.landry@noelassociés.com](mailto:p.landry@noelassociés.com)

Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Québec

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**D. Lynne Watt**

Telephone: (613) 786-8695  
Fax: (613) 788-3509  
Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Nova Scotia

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**D. Lynne Watt**

Telephone: (613) 786-8695  
Fax: (613) 788-3509  
Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of New Brunswick

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
MANITOBA**

Department of Justice  
Constitutional Law  
1230 - 405 Broadway  
Winnipeg, MB R3C 3L6

**Charles Murray**

Telephone: (204) 945-2852  
Fax: (203) 945-0054  
Email: [charles.murray@gov.mb.ca](mailto:charles.murray@gov.mb.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney  
General of Manitoba

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
BRITISH COLUMBIA**

1001 Douglas Street, 6th Floor  
PO Box 9280 Stn Prov Govt  
Victoria, BC V8W 9J7

**J. Gareth Morley**

Telephone: (250) 952-7644  
Fax: (250) 356-9154  
Email: [gareth.morley@gov.bc.ca](mailto:gareth.morley@gov.bc.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney  
General of British Columbia

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PRINCE  
EDWARD ISLAND**

Shaw Building, 4th Floor South  
95 Rochford Street, P.O. Box 2000  
Charlottetown, PEI C1A 7N8

**Ruth DeMone**

Telephone: (902) 368-5064  
Fax: (902) 368-4563  
Email: [rmdemone@gov.pe.ca](mailto:rmdemone@gov.pe.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney  
General of Prince Edward Island

**ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR**

4th Floor, East Block,  
Confederation Bldg., P.O. Box 8700  
St. John's, NL A1B 4J6

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**D. Lynne Watt**

Telephone: (613) 786-8695  
Fax: (613) 788-3509  
Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Agent for the Intervener, Attorney  
General Manitoba

**BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP**

World Exchange Plaza 100 Queen  
Street, suite 1300  
Ottawa, ON K1P 1J9

**Nadia Effendi**

Telephone: (613) 787-3562  
Fax: (613) 230-8842  
Email: [neffendi@blg.com](mailto:neffendi@blg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,  
Attorney General of British Columbia

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**D. Lynne Watt**

Telephone: (613) 786-8695  
Fax: (613) 788-3509  
Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,  
Attorney General of Prince Edward  
Island

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**Justin S.C. Mellor**

Telephone: (709) 729-0163

Fax: (709) 729-2129

Email: [jmellor@gov.nl.ca](mailto:jmellor@gov.nl.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney  
General of Newfoundland & Labrador

**RAE AND COMPANY**

900 - 1000 5th Avenue S.W.

Calgary, AB T2P 4V1

**L. Douglas Rae**

**Brooke Barrett**

Telephone: (403) 264-8389

Fax: (403) 264-8399

Email: [lorddoug@raeandcompany.com](mailto:lorddoug@raeandcompany.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, Indian  
Resource Council

**MAURICE LAW**

602 12th Avenue SW, Suite 100

Calgary, AB T2R 1J3

**Ryan Lake**

**Geneviève Boulay**

Telephone: (403) 266-1201 Ext: 236

Fax: (403) 266-2701

Email: [rlake@mauricelaw.com](mailto:rlake@mauricelaw.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, File Hills  
Qu'Appelle Tribal Council and Pasqua  
First Nation

**NANDA & COMPANY**

10007 - 80 Avenue NW

Edmonton, AB T6E 1T4

**Martin Olszynski**

**Avnish Nanda**

Telephone: (780) 801-5324

Fax: (587) 318-1391

Email: [avnish@nandalaw.ca](mailto:avnish@nandalaw.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, World Wildlife  
Fund Canada

**D. Lynne Watt**

Telephone: (613) 786-8695

Fax: (613) 788-3509

Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,  
Attorney General of Newfoundland &  
Labrador

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street

Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**Matthew Estabrooks**

Telephone: (613) 786-0211

Fax: (613) 788-3573

Email:

[matthew.estabrooks@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:matthew.estabrooks@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,  
Indian Resource Council

**WEST COAST ENVIRONMENTAL  
LAW**

700 - 509 Richards Street  
Vancouver, BC V6B 2Z6

**Anna Johnston**

Telephone: (604) 601-2508  
Fax: (604) 684-1312  
Email: [ajohnston@wcel.org](mailto:ajohnston@wcel.org)

Counsel for the Intervener, Nature Canada  
and West Coast Environmental Law  
Association

**BURNET, DUCKWORTH & PALMER**

2400, 525 - 8 Avenue SW  
Calgary, AB T2P 1G1

**Robert L. Martz**

Telephone: (403) 260-0393  
Fax: (403) 260-0332  
Email: [rmartz@bdplaw.com](mailto:rmartz@bdplaw.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian  
Association of Petroleum Producers

**CREASE HARMAN LLP**

1070 Douglas Street, Unit 800  
Victoria, BC V8W 2C4

**R. Bruce E. Hallsor**

**Josh A. Bloomenthal**

Telephone: (250) 388-5421  
Fax: (250) 388-4294  
Email: [Bhallsor@crease.com](mailto:Bhallsor@crease.com)

Counsel for the Interveners, Canadian  
Taxpayers Federation

**WOODWAR & COMPANY  
LAWYERS LLP**

200 -1022 Government Street  
Victoria, BC V8W 1X7

**Eamon Murphy**

**Tara McDonald**

Telephone: (250) 383-2356  
Fax: (250) 380-6560

**SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP**

100- 340 Gilmour Street  
Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3

**Marie-France Major**

Telephone: (613) 695-8855 Ext: 102  
Fax: (613) 695-8580  
Email: [mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca](mailto:mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Interveners, Canadian Taxpayers  
Federation

**SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP**

100- 340 Gilmour Street  
Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3

**Marie-France Major**

Telephone: (613) 695-8855 Ext: 102  
Fax: (613) 695-8580  
Email: [mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca](mailto:mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca)

Email:  
[eamon@woodwardandcompany.com](mailto:eamon@woodwardandcompany.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, Athabasca  
Chipewyan First Nation

**OSLER HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP**

Suite 2700, Brookfield Place  
225 - 6th Avenue S.W.  
Calgary, AB T2P 1N2

**Maureen E. Killoran, K.C.**

**Sean Sutherland**

**Brodie Noga**

Telephone: (403) 260-7000

Fax: (403) 260-7024

Email: [mkilloran@osler.com](mailto:mkilloran@osler.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, Business  
Council of Alberta

**ECOJUSTICE CANADA SOCIETY**

216 - 1 Stewart Street  
Ottawa, ON K1N 7M9

**Joshua Ginsberg**

**Anna McIntosh**

Telephone: (613) 903-5898 Ext: 700

Fax: (613) 916-6150

Email: [jginsberg@ecojustice.ca](mailto:jginsberg@ecojustice.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Ecojustice  
Canada Society

**ALBERTA COUNSEL**

800, 9707-110 Street, NW  
Edmonton, AB T5K 2L9

**Robert Reynolds, K.C.**

Telephone: (780) 652-1282

Fax: (780) 652-1312

Email: [r.reynolds@albertacounsel.com](mailto:r.reynolds@albertacounsel.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, Woodland Cree  
First Nation

**JFK LAW CORPORATION**

340-1122 Mainland Street  
Vancouver, BC V6B 5L1

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, Athabasca Chipewyan First  
Nation

**OSLER HOSKIN & HARCOURT  
LLP**

Suite 1900, 340 Albert Street  
Ottawa, ON K1R 7Y6

**Geoffrey Langen**

Telephone: (613) 787-1015

Fax: (613) 235-2867

Email: [glangen@osler.com](mailto:glangen@osler.com)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, Business Council of  
Alberta

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**D. Lynne Watt**

Telephone: (613) 786-8695

Fax: (613) 788-3509

Email: [lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:lynne.watt@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,  
Woodland Cree First Nation

**SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP**

100- 340 Gilmour Street  
Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3



Telephone: (604) 687-0549  
Fax: (607) 687-2696  
Email: [tdickson@jfkllaw.ca](mailto:tdickson@jfkllaw.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Mikisew Cree  
First Nation

**Marie-France Major**  
Telephone: (613) 695-8855 Ext: 102  
Fax: (613) 695-8580  
Email: [mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca](mailto:mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, Mikisew Cree First Nation

**McCARTHY TÉTRAULT, s.e.n.c.r.l.,  
s.r.l.**

1000 rue de la Gauchetière Ouest,  
Bureau 2500  
Montréal, QC H3B 0A2

**Dominique Amyot-Bilodeau**

**Jean Lortie**

**Mathieu Bernier-Trudeau**

**Simon Bouthillier**

Telephone: (514) 397-4100

Fax: (514) 875-6246

Email: [damyotbilodeau@mccarthy.ca](mailto:damyotbilodeau@mccarthy.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Hydro-Québec

**BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP**

Centennial Place, East Tower  
1900-520 3rd Ave SW  
Calgary, AB T2P 0R3

**Brett R. Carlson**

**Aidan N. Paul**

**Peter Banks**

Telephone: (403) 232-9500

Fax: (403) 266-1395

Email: [bcarlson@blg.com](mailto:bcarlson@blg.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian  
Constitution Foundation

**GALL LEGGE GRANT ZWACK LLP**  
1199 West Hastings Street, Suite 1000  
Vancouver, BC V6E 3T5

**Peter A. Gall, K.C.**

Telephone: (604) 891-1152  
Fax: (604) 669-5101  
Email: [pgall@glgzlaw.com](mailto:pgall@glgzlaw.com)

Counsel for the Interveners, Independent Contractors and Business Association, and Alberta Enterprise Group

**UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY**

2500 University Drive NW  
Calgary, AB T2N 1N4

**Shaun Fluker**

**David V. Wright**

Telephone: (403) 220-4939  
Fax: (403) 282-8325  
Email: [sfluker@ucalgary.ca](mailto:sfluker@ucalgary.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment

**McCARTHY TÉTRAULT LLP**

Suite 5300, Toronto Dominion Bank  
Toronto, ON M5K 1E6

**Brandon Kain**

**Holly Kallmeyer**

**Asher Honickman**

Telephone: (416) 601-7821  
Fax: (416) 868-0673  
Email: [bkain@mccarthy.ca](mailto:bkain@mccarthy.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Advocates for the Rule of Law

**ARVAY FINLAY LLP**

360 - 1070 Douglas Street  
Victoria, BC V8W 2C4

**David W.L. Wu**

Telephone: (604) 696-9828

**CAZA SAIKALEY LLP**

350-220 Laurier Ave West  
Ottawa, ON K1P 5Z9

**Albert Brunet**

Telephone: (613) 565-2292 Ext: 214  
Fax: (613) 565-2087  
Email: [abrunet@plaideurs.ca](mailto:abrunet@plaideurs.ca)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the Interveners, Independent Contractors and Business Association, and Alberta Enterprise Group

**CHAMP AND ASSOCIATES**

43 Florence Street  
Ottawa, ON K2P 0W6

**Bijon Roy**

Telephone: (613) 237-4740  
Fax: (613) 232-2680  
Email: [broy@champlaw.ca](mailto:broy@champlaw.ca)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**

Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**Jeffrey W. Beedell**

Telephone: (613) 786-0171  
Fax: (613) 563-9869

Fax: (888) 575-3281  
Email: [dwu@arvayfinlay.ca](mailto:dwu@arvayfinlay.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Oceans North  
Conservation Society

**CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL  
LAW ASSOCIATION**  
130 Spadina, Suite 301  
Toronto, ON M5V 2L4

**Richard D. Lindgren**  
**Joseph F. Castrilli**  
Telephone: (416) 960-2284  
Fax: (416) 960-9392  
Email: [lindgrer@lao.on.ca](mailto:lindgrer@lao.on.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian  
Environmental Law Association,  
Environmental Defence Canada Inc., and  
Miningwatch Canada Inc.

**BURNET DUCKWORTH & PALMER**  
2400, 525 - 8th Avenue SW  
Calgary, AB T2P 1G1

**Kylan Kidd**  
Telephone: (403) 260-0109  
Email: [kkidd@bdplaw.com](mailto:kkidd@bdplaw.com)

Counsel for the Intervener, Explorers and  
Producers Association of Canada

**JURISTES POWER**  
401 West Georgia Street  
Suite 1660  
Vancouver, BC V6B 5A1

**Ryan Beaton**  
Telephone: (604) 260-4462  
Fax: (604) 259-6007  
Email: [rbeaton@juristespower.ca](mailto:rbeaton@juristespower.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, First Nations  
Major Projects Coalition

Email: [jeff.beedell@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:jeff.beedell@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, Oceans North Conservation  
Society

**GOWLING WLG (Canada) LLP**  
Suite 2600, 160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3

**Jeffrey W. Beedell**  
Telephone: (613) 786-0171  
Fax: (613) 563-9869  
Email: [jeff.beedell@gowlingwlg.com](mailto:jeff.beedell@gowlingwlg.com)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, Canadian Environmental  
Law Association, Environmental  
Defence Canada Inc., and Miningwatch  
Canada Inc.

**POWER LAW**  
50 rue O'Connor, Bureau 1313  
Ottawa, ON K1P 6L2

**Jonathan Laxer**  
Telephone: (613) 907-5652  
Fax: (613) 907-5652  
Email: [jlaxer@powerlaw.ca](mailto:jlaxer@powerlaw.ca)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, First Nations Major  
Projects Coalition

**CENTRE QUÉBÉCOIS DU DROIT DE  
L'ENVIRONNEMENT**  
454, avenue Laurier Est  
Montréal, QC H2J 1E7

**David Robitaille**  
**Marc Bishai**  
Telephone: (514) 991-9005  
Fax: (514) 844-7009  
Email: [david.robaille@uottawa.ca](mailto:david.robaille@uottawa.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Centre  
québécois du droit de l'environnement

**DGW LAW CORPORATION**  
201 - 736 Broughton Street  
Victoria, BC V8W 1E1

**John W. Gailus**  
**Courtenay Jacklin**  
Telephone: (250) 361-9469  
Fax: (250) 361-9429  
Email: [john@dgwlaw.ca](mailto:john@dgwlaw.ca)

Counsel for the Intervener, Lummi Nation

**POWER LAW**  
50 rue O'Connor, Bureau 1313  
Ottawa, ON K1P 6L2

**Jonathan Laxer**  
Telephone: (613) 907-5652  
Fax: (613) 907-5652  
Email: [jlaxer@powerlaw.ca](mailto:jlaxer@powerlaw.ca)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, Centre québécois du droit  
de l'environnement

**SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP**  
100- 340 Gilmour Street  
Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3

**Marie-France Major**  
Telephone: (613) 695-8855 Ext: 102  
Fax: (613) 695-8580  
Email: [mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca](mailto:mfmajor@supremeadvocacy.ca)

Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the  
Intervener, Lummi Nation

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

<b>PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>A. Overview</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>B. Statement of Facts</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>PART II – RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN ISSUE</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>PART III – ARGUMENT</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>A. Provincial Jurisdiction over Natural Resources and Local Works and Undertakings</b> .....	<b>2</b>
(1) <b>Section 92A: The Natural Resources Amendment</b> .....	<b>2</b>
(2) <b>General Comments on Environmental Jurisdiction</b> .....	<b>4</b>
(3) <b>Environmental Laws Must Be Tied to Specific Heads of Power</b> .....	<b>7</b>
(4) <b>Provincial Jurisdiction over Local Works and Undertakings</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>B. Limits of Federal Environmental Jurisdiction</b> .....	<b>12</b>
(1) <b>Limited Scope of Federal Review</b> .....	<b>12</b>
(2) <b>Relevant Provisions of the <i>IAA</i></b> .....	<b>13</b>
(3) <b>The Case Law</b> .....	<b>15</b>
(4) <b>Summary</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>C. The <i>Regulations</i> Assert Jurisdiction over Provincial Works and Undertakings</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>PART IV – COSTS</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>PART VII – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES AND LEGISLATION</b> .....	<b>21</b>

## PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

### A. Overview

1. In 1870 and again in 1905, the federal government kept all the natural resources of the three Prairie provinces, giving itself all of the revenues from those resource revenues, as well as control over land and resource development in the Prairies. The federal government treated Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba as junior partners in Confederation, paying them allowances, instead of giving them the significant powers and financial resources held by other provinces.<sup>1</sup> It took 25 years of concerted effort by the three Prairie provinces to overturn that injustice.<sup>2</sup>

2. In 1982, concerned about the National Energy Policy and other federal encroachments over western resource policy, Premiers Blakeney and Lougheed insisted on the inclusion of the natural resources amendment in the Patriation package.<sup>3</sup> Section 92A(1) gives the provinces exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the “development, conservation and management” of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources, and sites and facilities in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy.<sup>4</sup>

3. The Attorney General submits that the new federal *Impact Assessment Act* (“IAA”) and the associated *Regulations* are simply an attempt to undo those constitutional guarantees, and to claim federal regulatory jurisdiction over the natural resources of the Prairie provinces by way of environmental regulation.<sup>5</sup> To the extent the *IAA* attempts to regulate local works and undertakings and provincial natural resource production in the guise of environmental legislation, it is *ultra vires* the powers of Parliament and thus unconstitutional. The *IAA* is also *ultra vires* to the extent it authorizes

---

<sup>1</sup> [Saskatchewan Act, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 13, ss. 20, 21](#) ; [Alberta Act, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 12, ss. 20, 21](#); [Manitoba Act, 1870, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 8, ss. 25, 30](#); [Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92\(5\), s. 109](#).

<sup>2</sup> [Constitution Act, 1930, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 26, implementing the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements](#); Martin, *The Natural Resources Question: The Historical Basis of Provincial Claims* (Winnipeg: Manitoba King’s Printer, 1920; facsimile reproduction, BibiloLife, LLC), at 9-16, 107-127, Book of Authorities, Tab 1 (“BoA”).

<sup>3</sup> Meekison and Romanow, “Western Advocacy and Section 92A of the Constitution”, in Meekison, Romanow and Moull, *Origins and Meanings of Section 92A: The 1982 Constitutional Amendment on Resources* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985), at 24-25, BoA Tab 2.

<sup>4</sup> [Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92A\(1\)](#), as enacted by the *Constitution Act, 1982*, s. 50.

<sup>5</sup> [Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c. 28](#) (“IAA”); [Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019-284](#) (“Regulations”).

federal decision makers to review a project's negative effects that do not relate directly or incidentally to an area of federal jurisdiction. In addition to these general concerns, the *Regulations* exceed federal authority, by regulating local works and undertakings.

**B. Statement of Facts**

4. Saskatchewan relies on the facts as stated by the Attorney General of Alberta.

**PART II – RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN ISSUE**

5. Saskatchewan submits that the two constitutional questions posed by the Attorney General of Canada in this Reference should be answered as follows:

(1) The *IAA* is *ultra vires* to the extent it authorizes federal review of projects that do not relate directly or incidentally to areas of federal jurisdiction. It cannot be used to regulate local works and undertakings, assigned to exclusive provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(10) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, and natural resource facilities, assigned to exclusive provincial jurisdiction under s. 92A(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, unless a clear federal interest is demonstrated in each case.

(2) The *Physical Activities Regulations*, SOR/2019-285 are *ultra vires* because they assert federal regulation over local works and undertakings based on their size or amount of production, a power which the federal Parliament does not have.

**PART III - ARGUMENT**

**A. Provincial Jurisdiction over Natural Resources and Local Works and Undertakings**

**(1) Section 92A: The Natural Resources Amendment**

6. The natural resources amendment, s. 92A of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, is a key part of the analysis in this case. It is important to remember why it was added to the Constitution. In the 1970s, Saskatchewan and Alberta both asserted that they needed explicit constitutional recognition of their power to control their own natural resources. Premier Lougheed summarised the Alberta position as follows:

The only way there can be a fair deal for the citizens of the outlying parts of Canada is for the elected provincial governments of these parts to be sufficiently strong to offset the political power in the House of Commons of the populated centres. That strength can only flow from the provinces' jurisdiction over the management of their own economic destinies and the development of the natural resources owned by the provinces.<sup>6</sup>

7. Even before the passage of s. 92A, this Court recognised and affirmed the principle that provincial jurisdiction over resource development is essential to provincial financial integrity. In striking down the NEP export tax on natural gas, the Court held:

The allocation in 1930, by agreement and constitutional amendment, of property to the Crown in the right of the Province of Alberta necessarily carries with it the right of the province to the proceeds of disposition—in the words of Duff J. to “enjoy the fruits of that property”. The resources were intended to be an important source of revenue, indeed the basis of the provincial financial integrity, and therefore must be capable of realization.<sup>7</sup>

8. The Attorney General submits that when the federal government agreed to include s. 92A in the Constitution, it accepted that s. 92A would limit the power of the federal government to regulate natural resources. Three of the leading Saskatchewan participants in the Patriation debate summarised the initial draft of the amendment outlined by the Alberta government, with the following conclusion: “This wide-ranging list prompted Ottawa to assert that its acceptance *would virtually remove the federal government from any meaningful role in the field.*”<sup>8</sup>

9. Although that statement was commenting on the first, broad Alberta proposal, it is clear that the final wording of s. 92A was a significant change. Meekison and Romanow characterise it as “...the only constitutional amendment contained in the *Constitution Act, 1982*, which on the face of *it alters the division of powers* between the Canadian government and the ten provincial governments.”<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Premier Peter Lougheed, opening statement at the Federal-Provincial Conference on the Constitution, Ottawa, October 30 – November 1, 1978; quoted in Romanow, Whyte and Leeson, *Canada ... Notwithstanding* (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984), at 25, BoA Tab 4; see also [Moull, “Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867”, \(1983\) \*Canadian Bar Review\* 61:4 715, at 731-732.](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Reference re Exported Natural Gas Tax, \[1982\] 1 SCR 1004](#), at 1080 (emphasis added).

<sup>8</sup> Romanow, Whyte and Leeson, *Canada ... Notwithstanding*, at 24, BoA Tab 4 (emphasis added). See also Meekison and Romanow, “Western Advocacy” at 19, BoA Tab 2; Moull, “Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867”, at 716.

<sup>9</sup> Meekison and Romanow, “Western Advocacy” at 3, BoA Tab 2 (emphasis added).



Another commentator summed up the substantial impact of s. 92A(1) as a “confirmation and enhancement of the legislative powers of the producing provinces.”<sup>10</sup>

10. Saskatchewan submits that s. 92A was incorporated into the Constitution to resolve the long-standing disputes over natural resource management.<sup>11</sup> To use the language of former counsel for Saskatchewan, it is “one of the threads of a thousand acts of accommodation” which are the “fabric of a nation,” quoted in *Reference re Secession of Quebec*.<sup>12</sup> For Saskatchewan, control over its natural resources is protected by s. 92A to further the federalism principle, recognised by the Supreme Court in the *Secession Reference*, that provincial governments must have autonomy “... to develop their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction.”<sup>13</sup>

11. This Court has recently confirmed the importance of that diversity as an important principle of federalism: “Federal power cannot be used in a manner that effectively eviscerates provincial power... A view of federalism that disregards regional autonomy is in fact as problematic as one that underestimates the scope of Parliament’s jurisdiction ...”<sup>14</sup>

12. It is in this context that this Court must review the constitutionality of the *IAA*. The Attorney General submits that the *IAA* is in fact an attempt to reverse the federal concessions over natural resources made in 1930 and 1982, in the guise of environmental legislation.

## **(2) General Comments on Environmental Jurisdiction**

13. The federal government does not have a general environmental jurisdiction which it can use to regulate the construction, operation and maintenance of local works and undertakings in a province, particularly those relating to the development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources, and electrical generation facilities. Rather, the provinces have exclusive

---

<sup>10</sup> Moull, “The Legal Effect of the Resource Amendment —What’s new in Section 92A?”, in Meekison, Romanow and Moull, at 47-53 (emphasis added), BoA Tab 3.

<sup>11</sup> [Cairns, Chandler and Moull, “The Resource Amendment \(Section 92A and the Political Economy of Canadian Federalism\)” \(1985\) 23:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 253](#), at 254, 263.

<sup>12</sup> [Reference re Secession of Quebec, \[1998\] 2 SCR 217](#), at para. 96.

<sup>13</sup> *Reference re Secession of Quebec*, at para. 58.

<sup>14</sup> [References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11](#), para. 49 (citations omitted).

jurisdiction over local works and undertakings as set out in ss. 92(10), 92(13) and 92(16) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*.

14. The federal government's power to regulate environmental issues must be closely linked to the heads of federal power, and cannot be used beyond the scope of those federal heads of power. The federal government cannot regulate the operation of local works and undertakings under the pretense of exercising federal environmental jurisdiction.

15. Saskatchewan submits that this case is the mirror image of the recent unanimous decision of this Court in *Reference re Environmental Management Act (BC)*, which held that the attempt by British Columbia to regulate the shipment of heavy crude oil on an inter-provincial pipeline exceeded provincial jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal held that the province lacked jurisdiction to regulate the internal operations of a federally regulated work or undertaking, and the proposed bill was therefore *ultra vires*. Given that ruling, the Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to consider the issues of inter-jurisdictional immunity or paramountcy.<sup>15</sup> On appeal by British Columbia, this Court unanimously dismissed the appeal from the bench. Speaking for the Court, the Chief Justice stated: "We are all of the view to dismiss the appeal for the unanimous reasons of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia."<sup>16</sup> Saskatchewan submits that judgment means that the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal are now also the reasons of this Court.

16. In the British Columbia case, Saskatchewan successfully argued that provincial environmental jurisdiction did not extend to the construction, management, and operation of an inter-provincial pipeline, because legislative jurisdiction over inter-provincial works and undertakings is exclusively assigned to the federal government. Provincial jurisdiction would apply to matters such as releases into the environment, clean-up requirements, and civil liability, but the province could not regulate the operation of the federally regulated pipeline. That was the core of federal jurisdiction under s. 92(10)(a) and s. 91(29) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*.

---

<sup>15</sup> [Reference re Environmental Management Act \(BC\), 2019 BCCA 181](#), at paras. 105-106.

<sup>16</sup> [Reference re Environmental Management Act \(BC\), 2020 SCC 1](#).

17. However, s. 92(10)(a) and s. 91(29) make it clear that federal jurisdiction over works and undertakings is exceptional: “exclusive provincial competence is the rule”.<sup>17</sup> Federal jurisdiction does not extend to **local** works and undertakings, which are under exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Saskatchewan submits that exactly the same division of powers analysis applies as in the British Columbia case, but this time in favour of the provinces: since the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over local works and undertakings, the federal government cannot regulate the construction, operation or management of those local works and undertakings. Yet that is exactly what the *IAA* does, and to that extent, it is *ultra vires*.

18. This argument is not based on inter-jurisdictional immunity, but on the basic concept of constitutional *vires*, as analysed by the unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal, and affirmed unanimously by this Court. In that case, the concept of *vires* favoured exclusive federal jurisdiction over the construction, operation and management of inter-provincial pipelines, and the province could not assert environmental jurisdiction to regulate that same matter. In this case, the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over the local works and undertakings, supported as well by exclusive jurisdiction over non-renewable natural resources and electricity generation.<sup>18</sup> The federal government does not have jurisdiction to regulate those undertakings, and therefore lacks the power to regulate the environmental aspects of the construction, operation and maintenance of local works and undertakings, as well as the development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources.

19. This approach is not a provincial “veto” over federal jurisdiction, nor is it a “silo” approach. It is an assertion that there is no general federal jurisdiction to regulate the environmental aspects of local works and undertakings. The federal government can only regulate matters closely tied to its heads of powers, and cannot assert such a broad environmental jurisdiction as to amount to a general environmental jurisdiction. Nor can it override the provincial power to assess the environmental aspects of local works and undertakings.

---

<sup>17</sup> [Northern Telecom v. Communications Workers, \[1980\] 1 SCR 115](#), at 132.

<sup>18</sup> *Constitution Act, 1867*, s. 92A(1).

### (3) Environmental Laws Must Be Tied to Specific Heads of Power

20. The leading cases from this Court make it clear that the environment is not itself a subject matter under the division of powers. It is simply too broad and too diffuse to be assigned to one jurisdiction or the other. Rather, each level of government can regulate aspects of the environment which are part of their specific heads of power.<sup>19</sup>

21. Nor does that mean that the environment is an area of shared or concurrent jurisdiction. The opening words of ss. 91 and 92 establish that each government has exclusive jurisdiction over its areas of legislative authority. There are only four areas of concurrent jurisdiction in Canadian constitutional law: the export of non-renewable natural resources from a province to another part of Canada; old age pensions; agriculture; and immigration.<sup>20</sup> Other than these four areas of concurrent jurisdictions, the general principle is exclusivity.<sup>21</sup> This Court has confirmed that while flexibility and cooperation are important to federalism, those values cannot override the constitutional division of powers.<sup>22</sup>

22. Each government's authority to regulate environmental issues therefore must be tied to specific heads of power in their respective areas of jurisdiction. The starting point is not "Does the federal government have power to regulate the environmental aspects of a particular activity?" Rather, the foundational question must be: "Does the federal government have power to regulate that particular activity?" If the answer to that question is "No, that activity is under provincial jurisdiction", then the fact that the federal government is asserting an environmental concern does not expand its powers and allow it to regulate that activity. The first and primary question is not an environmental one, but the basic question of the scope of federal jurisdiction.

23. This analysis does not mean that local works and undertakings are completely immune from federal regulation, any more than federally regulated works and undertakings are completely immune from provincial regulation. Rather, it means that the core of a local work or undertaking, particularly

---

<sup>19</sup> [Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada \(Minister of Transport\)](#), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at 63-66 ["Oldman"]; [R v Hydro-Quebec](#), [1997] 3 SCR 213, at para. 112; *Reference re Environmental Management Act* (BCCA), para. 12; *References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act*, para. 317.

<sup>20</sup> *Constitution Act, 1867*, ss. [92A\(2\)](#), [94A](#), and [95](#).

<sup>21</sup> [Asher Honickman, "Watertight Compartments: Getting Back to the Constitutional Division of Powers" \(2017\) 55:1 Alberta L Rev 225, at 227-235.](#)

<sup>22</sup> *References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act*, para. 50.

one dealing with non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources or electricity production, is within exclusive provincial jurisdiction and the federal government cannot intrude on that area. The federal government can regulate aspects that directly relate to areas of federal jurisdiction, but it cannot assert a general environmental jurisdiction, any more than the province of British Columbia could regulate the core federal aspect of an inter-provincial pipeline.

24. This analysis flows from two lines of cases: the cases detailing the limits of provincial jurisdiction in relation to federally regulated works and undertakings, and the line of cases which set out the limits of federal jurisdiction over local works and undertakings.

#### **(4) Provincial Jurisdiction over Local Works and Undertakings**

25. It is important to start with the wording of s. 92(10) itself:

*Subjects of exclusive Provincial Legislation*

**92.** In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,

...  
(10) Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following Classes:<sup>23</sup>

This is a general grant of provincial authority over local works and undertakings. The federal “classes” in (a), (b) and (c) are matters which connect the provinces or internationally, or have been brought under federal jurisdiction by a parliamentary declaration. Federal jurisdiction is exceptional, compared to the broad provincial grant.

26. The division of jurisdiction over works and undertakings is an unusual one, compared to the other subjects in s. 91 and s. 92. Unlike other heads of power, which are generally based on different types of legal subjects (e.g. criminal law compared to civil law; marriage and divorce compared to the solemnization of marriage), the federal government and the provincial government have jurisdiction over certain types of works and undertakings. The division between the two is based on the functional nature of the service they provide. Local works and undertakings are under exclusive provincial jurisdiction, based on the opening words of s. 92(10), coupled with s. 92(13) (property and civil rights) and s. 92(16) (matters of a local nature). A work or undertaking will only come under federal jurisdiction under s. 92(10)(a) and s. 91(29) if it provides a transportation or communication service *and* crosses provincial or international boundaries. It is the inter-provincial nature of a transportation

---

<sup>23</sup> *Constitution Act, 1867*, s. 92(10) (emphasis added).

or communication facility which brings it within federal jurisdiction, as explained by John A. Macdonald in the *Confederation Debates*.<sup>24</sup> Justice Newbury recognised this point in *Reference re Environmental Management Act (BC)*: heavy oil is neither federal nor provincial. What mattered was that it was being transported in an inter-provincial pipeline.<sup>25</sup>

27. Many of the cases about works and undertakings have arisen in relation to federally regulated works and undertakings. Two foundational decisions outlining the jurisdictional boundaries over works and undertakings are *Canadian Pacific Railway v Notre Dame de Bonsecours* and *Madden v. Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway Co.* In *Madden*, the Judicial Committee held that the province could not require a federally-regulated railway to build fences along its right-of-way to protect livestock. That law intruded on the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the construction and operation of the railway.<sup>26</sup> However, in *Notre Dame de Bonsecours*, the Judicial Committee held that an inter-provincial railway could be civilly liable under provincial law for damage it caused to others, by failing to clean a drainage ditch.<sup>27</sup>

28. This Court has continued to rely on these cases. In *Construction Montcalm*, Justice Beetz for the majority discussed the two cases and held that the province could not regulate the core operation of a federally regulated work or undertaking, but the province could regulate aspects of the federally regulated work or undertaking that did not come within those core areas.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, the Court has held that provincial environmental emission laws can apply to a federally regulated railway, citing *Notre Dame de Bonsecours*.<sup>29</sup> These cases were also relied on in *Reference re Environmental Management Act (BC)*.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> [Confederation Debates, 8th Parl., Prov. Canada, 3rd Sess. \(6 February 1865\), at 40](#); cited by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Reference re Environmental Management Act*, para. 63.

<sup>25</sup> *Reference re Environmental Management Act (BCCA)*, paras. 94-95.

<sup>26</sup> [Madden v. Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway Co., \[1899\] UKPC 47, \[1899\] AC 626, at 628.](#)

<sup>27</sup> [Canadian Pacific Railway v Notre Dame de Bonsecours, \[1899\] UKPC 22, \[1899\] AC 367, at 373-374.](#)

<sup>28</sup> [Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission, \[1979\] 1 SCR 754, at 772-773.](#)

<sup>29</sup> [Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., \[1995\] 2 SCR 1028.](#)

<sup>30</sup> *Reference re Environmental Management Act (BCCA)*, at paras. 65-67.

29. Saskatchewan submits that this same analysis applies the other way, when the federal government attempts to regulate local works and undertakings. The provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over local works and undertakings. The federal government lacks the power to regulate the core aspects of local works and undertakings, just as the provinces lack the power to regulate the core aspects of federally regulated works and undertakings.

30. Nor do close economic connections between a federally regulated undertaking and a provincially regulated undertaking allow the federal government to expand its jurisdiction to regulate the provincial undertaking. For example, federal jurisdiction over inter-provincial railways does not allow it to regulate grain elevators, in spite of the close economic and functional connection with railways.<sup>31</sup> Nor does Parliament have jurisdiction over railways that are not closely integrated into an inter-provincial railway, even if the short-line has an important economic function, such as providing grain cars for delivery by the inter-provincial railway to the port.<sup>32</sup> Federal jurisdiction over works and undertakings is limited by s. 92(10).

31. The federal environmental jurisdiction in relation to a local work or undertaking is therefore also limited. Just as the province cannot apply its environmental laws to the construction, operation and maintenance of a federally regulate work or undertaking, so too the federal government cannot apply its environmental laws to the core operations of a local work or undertaking. It can only regulate those aspects of the local work or undertaking which have a clear connection to the federal heads of power, rather than assert a broad environmental jurisdiction because of possible effects on matters within federal jurisdiction.

32. This limitation is particularly strong in relation to local works and undertakings in the areas of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources, and electricity generation. Provincial jurisdiction over local works or undertaking, combined with the subject matter of their operations, means that the federal government cannot regulate those core areas. The federal government once had complete authority over those matters in the three Prairie provinces, but it chose to divest itself of its **proprietary** jurisdiction in 1930, transferring it to the Prairie provinces. Exclusive provincial

---

<sup>31</sup> [The King v Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., \[1925\] SCR 434](#), at 446-448, 456-457.

<sup>32</sup> [United Transportation Union v Central Western Railway Corp., \[1990\] 3 SCR 1112](#), at 1143-1147.

**regulatory** jurisdiction was further confirmed by s. 92A, particularly sub-section (1), as part of the Patriation settlement in 1982. Having divested itself of its jurisdiction over natural resources, and recognised the exclusive regulatory power of the provinces in the natural resources amendment, the federal government cannot now try to reclaim a broad regulatory power over natural resources in the guise of environmental regulation.

33. The limited nature of the federal jurisdiction over local works and undertakings is also illustrated by the long line of cases relating to federal jurisdiction over the workplace. Starting with the decision of the Judicial Committee in the *Snider* case in 1925,<sup>33</sup> continuing through the *Stevedoring Reference*,<sup>34</sup> and on to *Northern Telecom*,<sup>35</sup> provincial jurisdiction over the workplace in works and undertakings is the norm, and federal jurisdiction is the exception. The federal government only has jurisdiction over the workplace in works and undertakings which are under federal jurisdiction. Other than those exceptional areas, the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over the workplace.

34. Nor can the federal government rely on the double aspect doctrine to assert environmental jurisdiction over local works and undertakings. In *Bell Canada*, Justice Beetz for a unanimous Court held that the double aspect doctrine cannot be used to allow both governments to regulate the workplace of a particular undertaking. Doing so would create an area of concurrent jurisdiction over the work or undertaking, contrary to the principle of exclusive jurisdiction set out in ss. 92(10) and 91(29).<sup>36</sup> Similarly, double aspect does not give the federal government environmental jurisdiction over a local work or undertaking.

35. Saskatchewan submits that this long line of well-established cases supports its position on the environmental jurisdiction of the federal government. Just as the federal government's workplace jurisdiction is limited to cases where the federal government has jurisdiction over that work or undertaking, its environmental jurisdiction is similarly limited. If it does not have jurisdiction over the

---

<sup>33</sup> [\*Toronto Electric Commissioners v Snider\*, \[1925\] UKPC 2, \[1925\] AC 396 \(PC\).](#)

<sup>34</sup> [\*Stevedores' Reference \(Reference re the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act\)\*, \[1955\] SCR 529.](#)

<sup>35</sup> *Northern Telecom v. Communications Workers*, at 132.

<sup>36</sup> [\*Bell Canada v. Quebec \(Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail\)\*, \[1988\] 1 SCR 749](#), at 765-766, 853; *References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act*, para. 128.



work or undertaking, it cannot assert environmental jurisdiction over the construction, operation or maintenance of that work or undertaking, any more than British Columbia could regulate the product carried by an inter-provincial pipeline, and the environmental aspects of the construction, operation or maintenance of that pipeline. The federal government cannot assert environmental jurisdiction to stop a local work “in its tracks”, any more than British Columbia could use its environmental jurisdiction to stop a federal pipeline.<sup>37</sup>

## **B. Limits of Federal Environmental Jurisdiction**

### **(1) Limited Scope of Federal Review**

36. Neither Parliament nor the provinces have general jurisdiction over the environment. There is no “environmental jurisdiction.” There is only jurisdiction over specifically-assigned heads of power, which includes the authority to regulate environmental *aspects* of these heads of powers, or to regulate them in a manner that is *mindful of* the environment.<sup>38</sup>

37. Even if the federal government has authority to conduct an environmental assessment of a particular project because it may affect an area of federal jurisdiction, the scope of its review is constitutionally limited. The *Constitution Act, 1867* does not authorize the federal government to assess whatever it desires, or considers important. The federal government can only scrutinize the project’s effects on areas of federal jurisdiction – such as inland fisheries, Indigenous peoples, and federal lands. It cannot go beyond the areas of federal jurisdiction and conduct a general environmental review.<sup>39</sup>

38. *Oldman* established that the federal environmental review can consider national and local socio-economic factors, but even so, that review must always be tied to federal heads of power. The fact that a particular project may have some impact on a federal head of power does not authorise the federal government to review all environmental aspects of the project: the review must always be tied to federal jurisdiction, and federal environmental regulations must always be limited to the federal aspect of the matter being regulated.<sup>40</sup> If a work or undertaking is under exclusive provincial jurisdiction, the federal government lacks jurisdiction to regulate the internal core aspects of that undertaking, whether

---

<sup>37</sup> *Reference re Environmental Management Act (BCCA)*, para. 101.

<sup>38</sup> *Oldman* at 63-68; [Quebec \(Attorney General\) v Moses, 2010 SCC 17, \[2010\] 1 SCR 557](#), at para. 121.

<sup>39</sup> *Oldman*, at 72-73.

<sup>40</sup> *Oldman*, at 66-67.

for environmental reasons or other reasons. Federal environmental concerns are not a magnet which pulls the entire work or undertaking into federal jurisdiction. The federal process can take into account local benefits in assessing whether the matter is in the public interest from a federal perspective, but the federal government cannot consider all aspects of the work or undertaking. To do so would turn the review of federal environmental implications into a general environmental review power, intruding on provincial power to review environmental issues under the provincial heads of power.

39. This Court has recently confirmed that analysis in its decision in *References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act*, citing with approval its earlier decisions that the environment is “not an independent matter of legislation” but rather “a sweeping subject or theme virtually all-pervasive in its legislative implications”, that “touch[es] several of the heads of power assigned to the respective levels of government”.<sup>41</sup>

## **(2) Relevant Provisions of the IAA**

40. Under the *IAA*, all impact assessments must take into account a broad range of factors, many of which lie outside federal jurisdiction. Saskatchewan submits that the federal review process cannot extend to the core operations of a provincially regulated work or undertakings. For example, hiring practices for that work or undertaking, such as “the intersection of sex and gender with other identity factors”, relate to the internal operations of the local work or undertaking and cannot be brought under federal jurisdiction by means of environmental review. There is no doubt that the federal government could consider those factors in relation to works and undertakings which are under federal jurisdiction, but it lacks jurisdiction to regulate the operations of local works and undertakings.

41. The impact assessment then results in a report that lands in the hands of the federal decision maker, who decides whether the project is “in the public interest” based on “the adverse effects within federal jurisdiction – and the adverse direct or incidental effects – that are indicated in the report”<sup>42</sup> and a consideration of other factors listed in s. 63 of the *IAA*.

---

<sup>41</sup> *References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act*, at para. 317.

<sup>42</sup> *IAA*, s 60 and ss 61-62.

42. The Attorney General of Canada asserts that the phrase “adverse effects within federal jurisdiction – and the adverse direct or incidental effects – that are indicated in the report” is the *IAA*’s saving grace, and restrains decision-making by ensuring decision makers only consider negative effects within federal jurisdiction when deciding whether a particular project is in the public interest.<sup>43</sup> The Attorney General of Canada asserts that the provisions in which the phrase appears clearly instruct federal decision makers to ignore vast sections of the impact assessment report before them, which must canvass a project’s positive and negative effects on areas outside federal jurisdiction, when making their decision.

43. Saskatchewan respectfully submits that Canada’s interpretation of such “decision-making provisions” is problematic. Why would the *IAA* direct the review agency to review adverse factors outside federal jurisdiction and include those factors in its report, and then direct the federal decision-maker to ignore those aspects of the report in making its decision?<sup>44</sup> While the provisions do refer to “adverse effects within federal jurisdiction”, they do not ensure that federal decision makers ignore the aspects of the environmental assessment that do not relate areas of federal jurisdiction. The provisions cannot bear the interpretation Canada puts upon them, and do not ensure federal assessments remain *intra vires*.

44. The *IAA* therefore does not preclude, and in fact directs, federal decision makers to consider factors well outside federal jurisdiction when determining whether a particular project is within the public interest. In this way, the *IAA* differs from its predecessors, which specifically restricted the scope of consideration to matters within federal jurisdiction.<sup>45</sup> As such, it invites unconstitutional interference with provincial jurisdiction. For example, the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada (“IAAC”) could initially obtain jurisdiction to review a particular project because it is a “designated project” that “may” affect aquatic species.<sup>46</sup> Even if the resulting impact assessment report concludes the project will not negatively affect any area of federal jurisdiction, the *IAA* empowers the decision

---

<sup>43</sup> Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, at paras 92-95.

<sup>44</sup> [IAA, ss. 60-62](#).

<sup>45</sup> [Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19](#), s 52, ss 5, 19 (repealed). See also the *Guidelines Order* at issue in *Oldman*, at 25-26.

<sup>46</sup> [IAA, s 7](#).

maker to determine the project is not in the public interest because the project's proponent has internal workplace policies which the IAAC disapproves of, for example concerning gender diversity.

### (3) The Case Law

45. The *IAA* is therefore the “Trojan horse” which La Forest J. cautioned against in *Oldman*. By authorizing federal decision makers to consider effects on matters outside federal jurisdiction, the *IAA* enables and directs “the federal government, on the pretext of some narrow ground of federal jurisdiction, to conduct a far-ranging inquiry into matters that are exclusively within provincial jurisdiction.”<sup>47</sup>

46. In *Oldman*, the Trojan horse issue was hypothetical because under the impugned *Guidelines Order*, the decision-maker was “only given a mandate to examine matters directly related to the areas of federal responsibility affected.”<sup>48</sup> Where a review was triggered, the *Guidelines Order* only permitted the consideration of environmental effects “which may have an impact on the areas of federal responsibility affected.”<sup>49</sup>

47. That the *Guidelines Order* did not instruct the federal review to consider matters outside federal jurisdiction was clearly an important factor in La Forest J's conclusion that it was *intra vires*.<sup>50</sup> His judgment was based on the principle that federal legislative power can only give federal environmental review agencies a mandate to examine matters specifically related to heads of federal responsibility.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, he explicitly stated: “Because of its auxiliary nature, environmental impact assessment can only affect matters that are ‘truly in relation to an institution or activity that is otherwise within [federal] legislative jurisdiction’ ”<sup>52</sup> and that a “necessary element of proximity... must exist between the impact assessment process and the subject matter of federal jurisdiction involved.”<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> *Oldman*, at 71-72.

<sup>48</sup> *Oldman*, at 71-72.

<sup>49</sup> *Oldman*, at 72.

<sup>50</sup> *Oldman*, at 71-72.

<sup>51</sup> See also [Prairie Acid Rain Coalition v Canada \(Minister of Fisheries & Oceans\), 2004 FC 1265](#) at para. 234; affirmed [2006 FCA 31](#).

<sup>52</sup> *Oldman*, at 72, citing [Devine v Quebec \(Attorney General\), \[1988\] 2 SCR 790](#) at 808.

<sup>53</sup> *Oldman*, at 72.

48. These principles from *Oldman* have been followed in subsequent cases. In *Quebec (Attorney General) v Canada (National Energy Board)*, this Court considered the scope of a federal environmental review under the *National Energy Board Act*. The Court stressed the importance of constraining federal environmental reviews to respect constitutional boundaries:

... it is nonetheless important that the jurisdiction of the Board be delineated in a manner that respects these [division of powers] concerns...

In defining the jurisdictional limits of the Board, then, this Court must be careful to ensure that the Board's authority is truly limited to matters of federal concern.<sup>54</sup>

49. In *Friends of the West Country Association v Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans)*, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's conclusion that the federal review was inappropriately narrow. Even though he called for a broader review in that case, Rothstein JA explicitly stated that constitutional limits must be respected:

... given the divided constitutional jurisdiction over environmental assessments between the federal government and the provinces, it follows that the federal responsible authority is to focus its environmental assessment on effects within federal jurisdiction - such as in this case, the effects on Navigation and Shipping, Inland Fisheries, and Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.<sup>55</sup>

50. Similarly in *Prairie Acid Rain Coalition v Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans)*, the Federal Court stated that "it could not have been Parliament's intent to authorize a Responsible Authority to environmentally assess aspects of a project unrelated to those heads of federal jurisdiction called into play by the project in question." This decision was affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal, where Rothstein JA also noted that in the context of a federal environmental review, "constitutional limits must be respected."<sup>56</sup>

51. In *Oldman*, this Court stated that Parliament has jurisdiction to consider matters which might normally be considered outside federal jurisdiction – such as nuisance from smoke or noise in a

---

<sup>54</sup> [Quebec \(Attorney General\) v Canada \(National Energy Board\), \[1994\] 1 SCR 159](#), at 192-193 (emphasis added).

<sup>55</sup> [Friends of the West Country Assn v Canada \(Minister of Fisheries & Oceans, \[2000\] 2 FC 263](#), at para. 38.

<sup>56</sup> *Prairie Acid Rain Coalition v Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans)* (FC), at para. 243; 2006 FCA 31 at para. 31.

municipality – when exercising jurisdiction over railways.<sup>57</sup> This, however, does not establish federal authority to consider environmental effects that do not touch on an area of federal jurisdiction. Regulation of a federal railway in a manner mindful of its effects on areas of provincial jurisdiction, such as noise pollution, is still in substance regulation of a federal railway. That is not true when a federal agency attempts to regulate an *in situ* oil sands extraction facility or a coal mine, located on provincial land. Such regulation ceases to have any connection to a federal head of power and is therefore *ultra vires*.<sup>58</sup>

#### (4) Summary

52. Saskatchewan submits that the scope of federal environmental review is and always has been limited: federal decision makers are restricted to matters within the scope of federal heads of power. The broad provincial jurisdiction over local works and undertakings, and the exclusive power to regulate the development and operation of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical generation, are not within federal jurisdiction and cannot be brought under federal jurisdiction under the guise of environmental regulation. The cases demonstrate this constitutional limit has been assumed in all the landmark cases delineating the scope of such federal review.

53. By requiring federal decision makers to consider factors well outside federal jurisdiction when determining whether a particular project is in the public interest, the *IAA* exceeds these constitutional limits. The *IAA* is accordingly *ultra vires* to the extent it authorizes federal decision makers to review a project's effects that do not relate directly or incidentally to an area of federal jurisdiction. Effects relating only to areas of provincial jurisdiction cannot be part the federal decision-making process.

54. Based on the above principles, the Attorney General submits that the general scope of review is simply too broad and is therefore *ultra vires*, to the extent it brings matters of provincial jurisdiction under federal environmental review.

---

<sup>57</sup> *Oldman*, at 66, 69.

<sup>58</sup> [Kennett, "Federal Environmental Jurisdiction After Oldman" \(1993\) 38:1 McGill LJ 180](#) at 187-193.

**C. The Regulations Assert Jurisdiction over Provincial Works and Undertakings**

55. The *Regulations* make it very clear how broadly the federal Cabinet has interpreted the powers granted to it under the Act. Saskatchewan submits that large portions of the *Regulations* exceed federal jurisdiction. The federal government does not have power to regulate the local works and undertakings in question, and therefore does not have power to regulate the environmental aspects of those local undertakings. It only has jurisdiction if it first demonstrates some connection to federal jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction cannot be assumed by Regulations.

56. Section 2(1) of the Regulations provides that the physical activities set out in the Schedule are “designated projects” under s. 2 of the *IAA*, which in turn triggers the impact review process. However, it is immediately apparent that many of the physical activities listed in the Schedule are in fact local works and undertakings, and therefore not within federal jurisdiction. Since they are not within federal jurisdiction, the federal government does not have a general power to regulate the construction, operation and maintenance of those works or undertakings, any more than the provinces can regulate the construction, operation and maintenance of federally regulated works and undertakings, such as the inter-provincial pipeline in *Reference re Environmental Management Act*.

57. For example, ss. 18, 19, 24 and 25 of the Regulations assert federal jurisdiction over metal mines, mills, and oil sands mines. Those activities are clearly local works and undertakings coming within exclusive provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(10) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*. They are also examples of facilities related to the exploration, development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources in the province. They are therefore under exclusive provincial jurisdiction under s. 92A(1)(a) and (b). The fact that the federal government is only attempting to regulate facilities which have production over certain levels does not give the federal government jurisdiction. It is the nature of the undertaking that decides whether it is under exclusive provincial jurisdiction, not its production volume.<sup>59</sup>

58. Similarly, ss. 30, 31, 32, 33, 37 and 38 all target facilities which produce or refine oil, gas, or other fossil fuels. Those facilities are all local works and undertakings in the province under s. 92(10), and the federal government has no power to regulate their construction, operation and maintenance. To

---

<sup>59</sup> *The King v Eastern Terminal Elevator Co.*, at 447.

the extent they are related to development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources, they are also under exclusive provincial jurisdiction under s. 92A(1)(a) and (b). Again, the fact that the *Regulations* only apply to facilities with production over a certain amount is irrelevant. It is the nature of the work or undertaking, not the amount it produces, which is determinative of federal or provincial jurisdiction.

59. Sections 42 and 43 designate electrical generating facilities. However, those too are under exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Section 92A(1)(c) provides that the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over the “development, conservation, and management” of electrical generating sites. The amount of electrical production is irrelevant to jurisdiction.

60. Similarly, s. 51 designates the “construction, operation, decommissioning, and abandonment of a new all-season highway” that is more than 75 km long, while s. 54 designates new railway lines over 50 km long, and new or expanded railway yards of more than 50 hectares. However, federal jurisdiction depends on the nature of the railway, not its size: is it an inter-provincial railway, or is it functionally integrated with an inter-provincial railway? If not, the railway or road is under exclusive provincial jurisdiction.<sup>60</sup> Yet the *Regulations* make no attempt to establish any linkage to federal jurisdiction. By basing the designation on length, purely local works and undertakings, such as a highway linking Regina to Saskatoon or a commuter train linking Calgary to Edmonton, would fall under federal environmental jurisdiction.

61. The Attorney General submits that the designation provisions of the *Regulations* are *ultra vires*. These are local works and undertakings under s. 92(10). The federal government does not have environmental regulatory power over their “construction, operation, decommission and abandonment”, any more than the provinces have control over the construction, operation, decommission and abandonment of federally regulated works and undertakings, such as inter-provincial pipelines.

62. This is not to say that any of these projects might have an impact on an area of federal jurisdiction, such as navigable waters or Indigenous hunting and treaty rights. However, to assert

---

<sup>60</sup> *United Transportation Union v Central Western Railway Corp.*, at 1147.




jurisdiction, the federal law must be tied to an area of federal jurisdiction. The federal government cannot assert jurisdiction based on the size of a project or the amount it produces.

**PART IV - COSTS**

63. The Intervener Attorney General for Saskatchewan does not seek costs and submits that the ordinary rule that costs are not awarded against an Intervener should apply.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2022.



---

**Thomson Irvine KC**



---

**for: Noah Wernikowski**

**PART VII – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES & LEGISLATION**

<b>Case Law:</b>	<b>Paragraph References (to Memorandum)</b>
<a href="#"><u>Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail), [1988] 1 SCR 749 EN &amp; FR</u></a>	34
<a href="#"><u>Canadian Pacific Railway v Notre Dame de Bonsecours, [1899] UKPC 22, [1899] AC 367</u></a>	27, 28
<a href="#"><u>Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission, [1979] 1 SCR 754 EN &amp; FR</u></a>	28
<a href="#"><u>Devine v Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 790 EN &amp; FR</u></a>	47
<a href="#"><u>Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 EN &amp; FR</u></a>	38, 45, 46, 48, 51
<a href="#"><u>Friends of the West Country Assn v Canada (Minister of Fisheries &amp; Oceans), [2000] 2 FC 263</u></a>	49
<a href="#"><u>The King v Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] SCR 434</u></a>	39, 57
<a href="#"><u>Madden v. Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway Co., [1899] UKPC 47, [1899] AC 626</u></a>	27
<a href="#"><u>Northern Telecom v. Communications Workers, [1980] 1 SCR 115 EN &amp; FR</u></a>	17, 33
<a href="#"><u>Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 SCR 1028 EN &amp; FR</u></a>	28
<a href="#"><u>Prairie Acid Rain Coalition v Canada (Minister of Fisheries &amp; Oceans), 2004 FC <a href="#">EN</a> &amp; <a href="#">FR</a>; affirmed 2006 FCA 31</u></a>	47, 50
<a href="#"><u>Quebec (Attorney General) v Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 SCR 159 EN &amp; FR</u></a>	48
<a href="#"><u>Quebec (Attorney General) v Moses, 2010 SCC 17, [2010] 1 SCR 557 EN &amp; <a href="#">FR</a></u></a>	36
<a href="#"><u>Reference re Environmental Management Act (BC), 2019 BCCA 181</u></a>	15, 26, 28, 35, 56
<a href="#"><u>Reference re Environmental Management Act (BC), 2020 SCC 1 <a href="#">EN</a> &amp; <a href="#">FR</a></u></a>	16

<a href="#">Reference re Exported Natural Gas Tax, [1982] 1 SCR 1004 EN &amp; FR</a>	7
<a href="#">Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 EN &amp; FR</a>	10
<a href="#">References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 EN &amp; FR</a>	11, 20, 21, 34, 39
<a href="#">R v Hydro-Québec [1997] 3 SCR 213 EN &amp; FR</a>	20
<a href="#">Stevedores' Reference (Reference re the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act), [1955] SCR 529</a>	33
<a href="#">Toronto Electric Commissioners v Snider, [1925] UKPC 2, [1925] AC 396 (PC)</a>	33
<a href="#">United Transportation Union v Central Western Railway Corp., [1990] 3 SCR 1112 EN &amp; FR</a>	30, 60
<b>Statutes, Regulations, Legislation:</b>	
<a href="#">Alberta Act, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 12 EN &amp; FR</a>	1
<a href="#">Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92, 92A, 94A, 95, s. 109 EN; art. 92, 92A, 94A, 95 FR</a>	5, 6, 13, 16, 37, 57
<a href="#">Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, c 19 (repealed) EN &amp; FR</a>	44
<a href="#">Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c. 28, s 7, ss. 60-62. ; art 7, arts 60-62 EN &amp; FR</a>	3, 5, 12, 17, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 53, 56
<a href="#">Constitution Act, 1930, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 26, implementing the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements EN &amp; FR</a>	1
<a href="#">Manitoba Act, 1870, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 8 EN &amp; FR</a>	1
<a href="#">Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019-284 EN &amp; FR</a>	3, 5, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61
<a href="#">Saskatchewan Act, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 13 EN &amp; FR</a>	1
<b>Secondary Sources:</b>	
<a href="#">Cairns, Chandler and Moull, “The Resource Amendment (Section 92A and the Political Economy of Canadian Federalism)” (1985) 23:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 253</a>	10

<a href="#"><u>Confederation Debates, 8th Parl., Prov.Canada, 3rd Sess. (6 February 1865), at 40</u></a>	26
<a href="#"><u>Kennett, “Federal Environmental Jurisdiction After Oldman” (1993) 38:1 McGill LJ 180</u></a>	51
Martin, <i>The Natural Resources Question: The Historical Basis of Provincial Claims</i> (Winnipeg: Manitoba King’s Printer, 1920; facsimile reproduction, BibiloLife, LLC)	1
Meekison and Romanow, “Western Advocacy and Section 92A of the Constitution”, in Meekison, Romanow and Moull, <i>Origins and Meanings of Section 92A: The 1982 Constitutional Amendment on Resources</i> (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985)	2, 8, 9
<a href="#"><u>Moull, “Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867”, (1983) <i>Canadian Bar Review</i> 61:4 715</u></a>	6, 8
Moull, “The Legal Effect of the Resource Amendment —What’s new in Section 92A?”, in Meekison, Romanow and Moull, <i>Origins and Meanings of Section 92A: The 1982 Constitutional Amendment on Resources</i> (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985)	9
Romanow, Whyte and Leeson, <i>Canada ... Notwithstanding</i> (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984)	6, 8